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We consider an economy in which a lender finances loans to borrowers by issuing 
a securitized product to investors and in which the credit quality of the product can 
depend on whether the lender screens borrowers.  In the presence of asymmetric 
information between the lender and investors regarding the credit quality of 
potential borrowers, overvaluation from the lender's perspective can occur for 
low-quality securitized products, which inefficiently induces the lender not to 
screen borrowers and hence to issue the securitized products of low credit quality.  
This is likely to occur when the probability of being in a bad state (i.e., the 
presence of low-quality borrowers) is low, or when the seeds of recession begin 
emerging in a booming economy.   
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 1 Introduction
The originate-to-distribute (OTD) business model is said to help match the diverse risk pref-
erences of investors and the payo⁄characteristics of securitized products in ￿nancial markets.
One would expect each specialized player in the securitization process, including originators
and issuers, to be guided by price mechanisms, thereby creating securitized products best-
matched to the risk-payo⁄ preferences of investors and yielding e¢ cient resource allocation.
In short, the pricing of securitized products should lead to the greatest economic welfare.
Such views of the OTD business model have helped expand the market for securitized
products in recent years. However, the advent of the subprime mortgage crisis has led
the presumed e¢ cacy of this business model to be called into question. With the bene￿t
of hindsight, it is not now extraordinary to point to incentive problems in di⁄erent steps
along the securitization process. For example, moral hazard problem taking advantage of
information superiority in transactions or elusive evaluations of securitized products have
been cited as underlying causes of the factors that led to the crisis.
This paper focuses on the e⁄ect of securitized product pricing in ￿nancial markets on
screening incentives for lenders by explicitly modeling the link between the market price of
securitized products and loan activities in the OTD business, and examines the potential
ine¢ ciencies in the OTD business model from this perspective. The basic setup of the
model is as follows: Having costly screening and veri￿cation technologies, a lender decides
whether to screen borrowers￿credit quality when making loans. There is asymmetric infor-
mation between the lender and securities investors regarding the distribution of the ultimate
borrowers￿credit quality, which is determined by the on-site state of the loan market. In
the good state, all potential borrowers are of high credit quality. In the bad state, certain
borrowers are of low credit quality. The lender knows the true state of this loan market, but
the investors cannot. Nor can the investors actually observe the lender￿ s screening activities.
The lender can verify the credit quality of the securitized product to be issued. The presence
or absence of such screening a⁄ects the credit quality of the loan pool backing the securitized
product. This factor, in conjunction with veri￿cation, a⁄ects the price that the investors
are willing to pay for the securitized product. In turn, the price of the securitized product
a⁄ects whether the lender undertakes such costly screening and veri￿cation. Given the cost
2of screening and veri￿cation, the lender screens borrowers and issues a securitized product
of high credit quality only when the price of the securitized product backed by screened loan
pool is high enough, relative to that of the securitized product backed by unscreened loan
pool, to cover the screening and veri￿cation costs.
We demonstrate below that under certain conditions, there exists an equilibrium in which
the pricing of the securitized product may distort the lender￿ s incentive to screen borrowers.
Indeed, we show that a securitized product of low credit quality can be overpriced from
the lender￿ s perspective in the bad state. When the low-quality product is su¢ ciently
overpriced, the lender will choose not to screen borrowers and to issue a low-quality product,
even in the case in which, without such overvaluation, he would screen borrowers and issue
a high-quality product. This happens because the lender￿ s gains from issuing a high-quality
product at a higher price do not exceed the cost of screening and veri￿cation borne by the
lender. We will derive conditions for the emergence of ine¢ cient equilibrium pricing and
discuss implications for policy measures required to enforce optimal levels of screening to
achieve e¢ ciency in the OTD business model.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related papers. Section 3 formu-
lates the model. Section 4 derives the results of the model analysis and shows comparative
statics based on the results. Section 5 discusses the results obtained, and Section 6 provides
some concluding remarks.
2 Related Papers
The interest in this paper is closely related to the one in Gorton and Pennacchi (1995).
They study incentive compatible loan sales contracts by a bank (a lender) and investigate
circumstances wherein a bank originates loans after a costly screening of borrowers￿credit
quality, then sells a portion of the loans to outside investors. They then examine the optimal
levels of screening e⁄orts and loan sales by the originating bank.1 Our model considers a
similar (albeit more stylized) situation and analyzes optimal screening e⁄orts for a bank.
1Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) point out that their model can also be interpreted as a costly monitoring
model.
3Our work is also closely related to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). They analyze the e⁄ects
of wealth distribution among all risk-neutral and capital-constrained ￿rms, intermediaries,
and investors on investment, interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. In their model,
monitoring by intermediaries improves the quality of projects undertaken by the ￿rms, which
increases the return on investment for the ￿rms and hence increases the aggregate amount
of capital that intermediaries and investors are willing to provide. Thus, in equilibrium, the
investors￿required rate of return should a⁄ect the intensity of monitoring by intermediaries
and hence the quality of projects. In our paper, the price that investors are willing to pay
for a securitized product a⁄ects the lender￿ s incentive to screen borrowers and the credit
quality of the loan pool. However, unlike Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), there is asymmetric
information between the lender and the investors on the true state of the loan market, and the
prices in equilibrium endogenously determine the intensity of the lender￿ s screening e⁄orts,
the credit quality of the loan pool, and the credit quality of securitized products.
In the literature on security design, Allen and Gale (1988) are closely related to this
paper. Allen and Gale (1988) analyze security innovations by producers who maximize
pro￿ts from selling securities backed by their production to consumers. Our model can be
regarded as an extension of Allen and Gale (1988) to the speci￿c context of loan screening,
wherein asymmetric information between lenders and investors yields a complex relationship
between the state of the loan market, the market price of securitized products, and loan
screening incentives.
This paper is also closely related to DeMarzo (2005) and DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999)
that analyze the optimal payo⁄design of securitized products, given asymmetric information
between originators and investors. In these papers, the credit quality of securitized products
is determined by tranching the underlying loan pool, or by creating a senior claim. In
contrast, the securitized product in this paper is backed by the whole loan pool, and its
credit quality is determined by screening the borrowers in the loan pool.
Our paper is also closely related to the strand of empirical studies of loan standard
determinants. Jimenez and Saurina (2006) show in their study of Spanish banks that high-
risk borrowers are more likely to be granted loans during boom times than during leaner
years. Dell￿ Ariccia et al. (2008) investigate the factors underlying lending standards in
4US mortgage loan markets, discussing their relationship to ex post delinquencies in the
subprime mortgage market. They ￿nd that a decline in lending standards is associated with
an increase in the number of loan applicants, suggesting that a credit boom a⁄ects lending
standards. They also ￿nd that an increase in competition and securitization transactions
lowers lending standards. Such a decline in lending standards has not been related to the
economic fundamentals of the loan applicants. As a result, delinquency rates rose more
sharply in areas that experienced larger increases in the number and volume of originated
loans, competition, and securitization transactions.
Berger and Udell (2004) develops the so-called institutional memory hypothesis to explain
the cyclical pro￿le of loans and nonperforming loan losses, positing that as time passes since
the most recent loan crisis, loan o¢ cers become less skilled in screening when to grant loans
to high-risk borrowers. It therefore becomes di¢ cult to ￿nd skilled loan o¢ cers inside a
bank and to hire skilled loan o¢ cers on the labor market. During the next boom, with its
surging pool of loan applicants, the shortfall in skilled loan o¢ cers reduces the quality of loan
processing and risk assessments, leading to lower pro￿tability for the bank. The empirical
analysis of US banks in the paper supports this hypothesis. Focusing on how reward and
punishment are implemented in a bank, Rajan (1994) suggests that incentive mechanisms
for bank managers explain ￿ uctuations in loan standards.
In general, these works point to low lending standards in boom times and high lending
standards in recessions. The results presented in this paper are consistent with this ￿nding,
but point to a more subtle phenomenon: Lenders will refrain from screening borrowers and
are more likely to issue low-quality securitized products, when the bad state in which certain
borrowers are of low quality may occur with relatively low probability against the good state
in which all borrowers are of high quality. This result seems realistic. When the state of
the loan market is good and all borrowers are of high quality, little screening is needed, and
an equilibrium without screening should emerge. When the state of the loan market begins
to degrade or when the bad state can occur with low probability, as long as the investors
cannot tell the true state, the price that the investors give for the securitized product is
the same in both bad and good states and still high enough because products are likely to
be of high credit quality. However, since the price is the same in both the good and bad
states and high enough, the lender does not have the incentive to perform costly screening
5or veri￿cation in either loan market state, resulting in the issue of low-quality securitized
products. On the other hand, when the state of the loan market is bad with high probability,
e⁄orts for screening and veri￿cation are more likely to reward the lender, since investors price
high-quality securitized products much higher than low-quality securitized products, leading
to an equilibrium with screening and veri￿cation.
Finally, the ￿nancial system perspective theory proposed in Shin (2008, 2009) gives in-
sight on determinants of loan standards, as shown in a discussion of a potential mechanism
underlying the expansion of the subprime mortgage problem. The theory states that the
in￿ ow of funds from outside the leveraged ￿nancial institution sector enables the sector to
expand its total asset holdings against ultimate borrowers. As the loan capacity of the sec-
tor expands, the ￿nancial institutions begin ￿lling this capacity by ￿nding borrowers even
by descending the ladders of credit quality. While the ￿nancial system perspective theory
attributes declining loan standards to increasing loan capacity, this is not a factor in the
model discussed herein. Rather, this paper provides a complementary explanation for de-
terminants of loan standards in terms of the relationship between securities pricing and loan
screening incentives.
3 The Model
There are two periods, period 0 and period 1. There are borrowers, a lender, and investors,
all of whom live for two periods. The lender makes loans to the borrowers in period 0
and collects repayments in period 1. The lender ￿nances the loans by selling a securitized
product backed by these loans to the investors in period 0. There are two possible states of
the loan market: the good state !g and the bad state !b. In the good state, all borrowers
are of high credit quality. In the bad state, certain borrowers are of low credit quality.
The good state occurs with probability 1 ￿ p (0 < p < 1), while the bad state occurs with
probability p. Although all borrowers, the lender, and the investors know the probability of
a good or bad state, only the lender knows which state has actually occurred in period 0.
63.1 Borrowers and Loan Opportunities
A continuum of borrowers exists, with each borrower borrowing D (< 1) amount of loan in
period 0 by promising to repay 1 amount in period 1. The borrowers are of either high or low
quality. High-quality borrowers will repay their loans with probability 1 by paying 1 back
to the lender when the loans come due. Low-quality borrowers may default with probability
q by making only partial repayment z (0 < z < 1) to the lender when the loans come due,
while making full repayment by paying 1 with probability 1￿q. We assume that the defaults
of the low-quality borrowers are perfectly correlated. To clarify our exposition of the essence
of the main results, we also assume that the defaults on the part of low-quality borrowers
are independent of the state of the loan market. Note that the expected repayment of a
low-quality borrower is given by (1 ￿ q)1 + qz.
The composition of high and low-quality borrowers in the loan market is given exoge-
nously and depends on the state of the loan market. In the good state, there are only
high-quality borrowers. In the bad state, certain borrowers are of low quality, and the ratio
of high-quality borrowers in all loan opportunities is 1￿￿ while that of low-quality borrowers
is ￿. For the ease of analysis below, we assume that the mass of borrowers is greater than
1
1￿￿.2
Finally, we assume that each borrower obtains the same amount uB of utility by borrowing
D from the lender, regardless of whether the borrower is of high or low credit quality.
3.2 The Lender and Securitization
There is a lender who makes loans to borrowers in period 0 and collects repayments in period
1. The lender ￿nances the loans by selling a securitized product backed by the loans to
investors in period 0. Thus, the lender is the originator of the loans and the issuer of the
securitized product.3 The payo⁄ of the securitized product is equal to the total amount
2This assumption guarantees that the number of good borrowers are large enough so that the lender can
make loans only to the high credit quality borrowers by screening in the bad state !b.
3A non-bank MBS originator is the example for the lender in this paper. Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008)
provide an overview of the subprime mortgage securitization process and problems arising from informational
frictions between players in the process.
7of repayment by the borrowers in period 1. We assume that the nominal amount of the
securitized product issued by the lender is set to 1. That is, the lender has an exogenously
given target for the issue amount of the securitized product. We also assume that the lender
sells all portions of the securitized product in period 0 to generate cash.4
The lender can screen the quality of loan opportunities if he bears screening cost ￿s > 0.
Thus, in the bad state !b where low-quality borrowers are possible, the lender￿ s decision to
pay this cost determines the credit quality of the loan pool. If the lender pays the screening
cost, the lender can make loans only to high-quality borrowers and issue a securitized product
backed solely by high-quality loans. If the lender chooses not to pay the screening cost, he
can still issue the securitized product, but the product is now backed by a mixture of high-
and low-quality loans. In other words, the lender makes loans randomly and issues a
securitized product backed by this loan pool. The credit quality of the loan pool is re￿ ected
in the payo⁄ of the securitized product issued by the lender.
Let y be the payo⁄ of the securitized product in period 1. Note that y depends on the
credit quality of the loans made by the lender. In the good state !g, in which all borrowers
are of high credit quality, and in the bad state !b if the lender screens borrowers and makes
only high-quality loans, y = 1; that is, the securitized product backed by high-quality loan
pool is risk-free. In the bad state !b, if the lender does not screen borrowers and the
loan pool includes low-quality borrowers, y is a random variable that takes the value 1 with
probability 1￿q, and (1￿￿)+￿z with probability q; that is, the securitized product backed
by low-quality loan pool is vulnerable to defaults. We de￿ne x = (1￿q)1+qf(1￿￿)+￿zg.
A costly veri￿cation technology exists whereby the lender can verify the credit quality
of the securitized product for the investors. The cost of veri￿cation borne by the lender is
￿v > 0.5 We assume that this veri￿cation is so accurate that investors can be assured of
the veri￿ed credit quality.
The lender can observe which state of the loan market, !g or !b, occurs at the start of
period 0. However, the lender cannot credibly inform the investors of the true state for
4As in DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) and DeMarzo (2005), we may assume that it is costly for the lender
to hold assets other than cash from period 0 to period 1. We then assume that the cost is so high that it is
advantageous for the lender to sell all assets in period 0.
5This veri￿cation technology may be interpreted to be a benevolent and reliable rating agency. We do
not investigate moral hazard problem or inability of such rating agency, although these are important issues.
8free. Let S(￿;!) be the price of the securitized product when the lender pays the costs
￿ of screening and/or veri￿cation in state !. Note that ￿ = 0 implies that the lender
performs neither screening nor credit-quality veri￿cation, ￿ = ￿s only screening, ￿ = ￿v only
veri￿cation, and ￿ = ￿s + ￿v both screening and veri￿cation.
After observing the true state of the loan market, the lender decides whether to perform
screening and/or veri￿cation to maximize pro￿ts from the OTD business. That is, for each
state ! = !g;!b, the lender solves the following pro￿t maximization problem:
Max￿[S(￿;!) ￿ ￿ ￿ D]
s:t: ￿ = 0; ￿s; ￿v; or ￿s + ￿v:
3.3 Investors
There are risk-neutral investors in ￿nancial markets. In period 0, these investors purchase
the securitized product. In period 1, they consume the proceeds from their investment. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that the investors have no discount between period 0 and 1.
We also assume that the investors behave competitively. Thus, the price of the securitized
product purchased by the investors is determined by the investors￿expected payo⁄ for the
securitized product.
We assume that, unlike the lender, the investors do not know the true state of the
loan market, creating asymmetric information between the lender and the investors. The
investors do not know whether the loan market is in the good state !g, in which all borrowers
are of high quality or in the bad state !b, in which certain borrowers are of low quality.
Moreover, the investors cannot assess the credit quality of the securitized product, either.
The lender only can verify the credit quality of the securitized product by paying veri￿cation
cost ￿v. The investors observe whether the lender performs this veri￿cation, infer the credit
quality of the securitized product, and price the securitized product based on this inference.
94 Equilibrium and Incentives to Issue Low-Quality Se-
curitized Products
Let Sh be the price given by investors to a high-quality securitized product whose expected
payo⁄in period 0 is 1 with probability 1, when the investors know the securitized product is
of high quality. Let Sl be the price given by investors to a low-quality securitized product
whose expected payo⁄ in period 0 is x, when the investors know the securitized product is
of low quality. Note that Sh = 1 and Sl = x.
We assume that the following condition holds:
x < 1 ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿v; (1)
or, equivalently, Sl < Sh ￿￿s ￿￿v. That is, in the bad state !b, it is socially more valuable
to screen borrowers and issue high credit-quality securitized products by paying screening
and veri￿cation costs than to omit screening and veri￿cation, and issue low credit-quality
securitized products.
4.1 A Benchmark Case in Which Investors Know the True State
of the Loan Market
In this subsection, as a benchmark, we consider a case in which the investors know the state
of the loan market, i.e., good or bad, before purchasing the securitized product in period 0.
However, we assume that the investors cannot observe whether the lender screens borrowers.6
Since the investors know the true state, in the good state !g in which all borrowers are
of high credit quality, the securitized product is of high quality, and its price is Sh = 1. In
the bad state !b in which certain borrowers are of low credit quality, the credit quality and
price of the securitized product depend on whether the lender screens borrowers and veri￿es
the credit quality of the product. In this case, since Sl < Sh ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿v, the lender screens
the borrowers, makes loans only to high-quality borrowers, veri￿es the credit quality, and
6If the investors can also observe whether the lender screens borrowers, the investors and the lender have
symmetric information. In this case, the lender does not need to verify the credit quality of the securitized
product, and we obtain the same result as below, where the veri￿cation cost ￿v is set to zero.
10sells the high-quality securitized product to investors at price Sh. Thus, in equilibrium, the
lender issues only securitized product of high credit quality, without paying any technology
cost in the good state and with paying the screening and veri￿cation costs in the bad state.
Note that since each borrower obtains the same amount uB of utility from borrowing and
the lender makes the same amount of loans to the borrowers, the welfare of the borrowers
remains the same. Additionally, since the investors are risk-neutral, the net gain of their
expected utility, or the expected payo⁄ less the price of the securitized product, is always
zero ex ante or before the true state is realized. Hence, the net ex ante gain of welfare
in this economy can be measured by the expected value of the securitized product less the
amount of loans and screening and veri￿cation costs, or the lender￿ s pro￿ts, with respect to
the state of the loan market.
Since the net ex post gain of welfare is Sh ￿D in the good state and Sh ￿D ￿￿s ￿￿v in
the bad state, the net ex ante gain of welfare is (1￿p)(Sh ￿D)+p(Sh ￿D￿￿s ￿￿v) in the
benchmark case in which the investors know the true state of the loan market but cannot
observe whether the lender screens borrowers.7
4.2 A Pooling Equilibrium with Low-Quality Securitized Products
Recall that there is asymmetric information between the lender and the investors so that
unlike the lender, the investors do not observe the true state of the loan market. Such
asymmetric information between the lender and the investors may result in a certain pricing
of the securitized product, moderating the lender￿ s incentive to screen the borrowers￿credit
quality. To describe such a situation, we are interested in a pooling equilibrium in which a
high-quality securitized product is issued in the good state, a low-quality securitized product
is issued in the bad state, and both are given the same price by investors.
Consider an equilibrium in which the lender does not verify the credit quality of the
securitized product in either the good state !g or the bad state !b. Since investors can
7If the investors and the lender have symmetric information and the investors know the true state of the
loan market and can observe whether the lender screens borrowers, there is no need for veri￿cation in the
bad state. In such a case, the net gain of welfare becomes Sh ￿D in the good state and Sh ￿D ￿￿s in the
bad state. This is the ￿rst best of the economy.
11observe only whether the lender performs the veri￿cation, they cannot tell whether they are
in the good or bad state. Hence, the investors price the securitized product as the average
of its values in the good state and the bad state. In the good state, all borrowers are of
high credit quality, the securitized product is of high quality, and hence the value should be
Sh = 1. In the bad state, certain borrowers are of low credit quality. Now, assume that the
lender does not screen borrowers, makes loans randomly, and hence issues the low-quality
securitized product. (We will soon state the conditions under which this holds true.) Then,
the value of the product in the bad state should be Sl = x ￿ (1￿q)1+qf(1￿￿)1+￿zg. Thus,
the price given by investors to the securitized product is ￿ S = (1￿p)Sh+pSl = (1￿p)1+px.
By de￿nition, Sl < ￿ S < Sh.
In the good state !g, the lender decides whether to verify the credit quality of the
securitized product. (Note that all borrowers are of high quality, removing any need for
screening.) If the lender performs veri￿cation, the investors know that the credit quality
of the securitized product is high, and give price Sh to the product. If the lender does not
perform veri￿cation, the price is ￿ S. Thus, in the equilibrium without veri￿cation considered
here, the price of the securitized product is ￿ S rather than Sh. That is, the product is
undervalued. Despite this underpricing, the lender will choose not to perform veri￿cation
in the good state, if
Sh ￿ ￿v ￿ ￿ S:
where we assume that when Sh ￿￿v = ￿ S, the lender chooses not to verify the credit quality.
In the bad state !b, the lender can issue a high-quality product at price Sh by screening
borrowers and verifying the credit quality of the securitized product. However, he will
choose not to do so if the choice is more pro￿table; that is, if the following condition holds:
Sh ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿v ￿ ￿ S:
Clearly, Sh￿￿s￿￿v ￿ Sh￿￿v. Thus, if Sh￿￿v ￿ ￿ S, there exists a pooling equilibrium in
which the lender neither screens the borrowers nor veri￿es the credit quality of the securitized
product in either the good or bad states, but sells a high-quality securitized product in the
good state and a low-quality securitized product in the bad state at the same price ￿ S.
12Recall that Sh = 1 and Sl = x. With a simple calculation (shown in the appendix), we
have the following claim:
Proposition 1
There exists a pooling equilibrium in which the lender neither screens borrowers
nor veri￿es the credit quality of the securitized product in either the good or
bad states of the loan market, but sells the securitized product of high (or low)
quality in the good (or bad) state at price ￿ S if




Moreover, ex ante, the pooling equilibrium is less e¢ cient than the benchmark
by the expected loss
p(1 ￿ x ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿v)
of issuing low-quality securitized products in the bad state.
In the good state, the net ex post gain of the economy is the sum of the lender￿ s gain
￿ S ￿ D and the investors￿Sh ￿ ￿ S, which is Sh ￿ D. This is equal to the net ex post gain
Sh ￿ D in the good state of the benchmark equilibrium. Thus, the ine¢ ciency of the
pooling equilibrium must be attributable to ine¢ cient lending/screening in the bad state of
the pooling equilibrium.
Such ine¢ cient screening occurs for the following reason: In the bad state of the pooling
equilibrium, a securitized product of low credit quality is issued, but its price at ￿ S(> Sl)
is overvalued from the perspective of the lender, since investors cannot distinguish it from
a high-quality product. Due to this overvaluation, the lender has less incentive to screen
borrowers than when the low-quality product is priced correctly, at Sl. This is because
the lender￿ s net gain (Sh ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿v) ￿ ￿ S from screening and veri￿cation to issue a high-
quality product when the low-quality product is overpriced at ￿ S is less than his net gain
(Sh ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿v) ￿ Sl from screening and veri￿cation to issue high-quality products when the
low-quality product is correctly priced at Sl.
13In other words, such overvaluation from the lender￿ s perspective diminishes penalty on
the lender for neglecting screening, reducing the lender￿ s incentive to screen borrowers, and
resulting in ine¢ cient screening. Thus, the market price may not provide appropriate
incentives to lenders to screen borrowers and issue securitized products e¢ ciently.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that this overvaluation tends to occur when the prob-
ability of bad state p is relatively small and when the expected payo⁄ x of the low-quality
securitized product is relatively large. That is, the low-quality securitized products attribut-
able to ine¢ cient screening are likely to be issued when the bad state is deemed less likely, or
when the seeds of recession accompanied by deteriorating credit quality of borrowers begin
to emerge in a booming economy.
4.3 An Equilibrium with Only High-quality Securitized Products
Depending on the parameter values of the economy, there also exists an equilibrium in which
the lender issues only securitized products of high credit quality in both the good and bad
states. We consider the case in which
￿ S < Sh ￿ ￿v;
or equivalently, 1 ￿ x >
￿v
p . Note that in this case, the lender in the good state has no
incentive to issue a securitized product without veri￿cation. Hence, the investors give the
price Sl to the securitized product without veri￿cation, and Sl < ￿ S < Sh ￿ ￿v. Therefore,
in the good state, the lender veri￿es the securitized product. Also, in the bad state, the
lender performs screening and veri￿cation, since without such veri￿cation, the price of the
product will be Sl, which is less than Sh￿￿s￿￿v. Consequently, in both the good and bad
states, only securitized products of high credit quality are issued and veri￿ed. We call this
equilibrium a separating equilibrium because although the realized quality of the securitized
product is the same, the choice of action by the lender di⁄ers for each state of the loan
market; in the good state, the lender pays the cost of veri￿cation; in the bad state, he pays
the cost of veri￿cation and screening.
The net ex post gain in the good state is Sh ￿ ￿v ￿ D, less than the benchmark net ex
post gain Sh￿D by veri￿cation cost ￿v. On the other hand, the net ex post gain in the bad
14state is Sh ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿v ￿ D, equal to that of the benchmark. Thus, the net ex ante gain is
less than that of the benchmark by the amount of the expected veri￿cation cost (1 ￿ p)￿v.
From the arguments above, we have the following claim:
Proposition 2
There exists a separating equilibrium in which the lender issues only high-quality
securitized products with screening and veri￿cation in the bad state and with
veri￿cation in the good state if




Moreover, ex ante, this equilibrium is less e¢ cient than the benchmark by the
expected cost
(1 ￿ p)￿v
of veri￿cation in the good state.
It is worth noting that in our setting, veri￿cation cost ￿v is wasted in the good state
for the lender to separate the high-quality product in the good state from the low-quality
product in the bad state. This situation occurs when the probability of bad state p is
relatively large and when the expected payo⁄ x of the low-quality securitized product is
relatively small. Thus, when investors know that the economy is highly likely to be in the
bad state, the lender will tend to issue only high-quality securitized products by paying the
cost for the separation in the good state.
4.4 Comparative Statics
Note that the ine¢ cient screening levels described in the previous section occur due to pooling
equilibrium-pricing of the securitized product and that such pricing occurs since investors
cannot distinguish between high-quality and low-quality products. We have derived the
15conditions for such pricing and ine¢ cient screening levels. In this section, we provide
comparative statics regarding these conditions and investigate the relationship between the
state of the loan market and the resulting equilibrium.







Figure 1 shows the areas separated by the above condition for the di⁄erent types of equi-
librium. Note that the conditions for pooling equilibrium (equation (2)) and for separating
equilibrium (equation (3)) are mutually exclusive. The area marked A is the area in which
the separating equilibrium holds and only high-quality securitized products are issued. The








Figure 1. Areas of Di⁄erent Equilibrium Types
The ￿gure suggests an interesting observation. In the area above p = ￿v, the area with
smaller x with a certain value of p tends to be the one for the separating equilibrium. This
accords with intuition: The lower the average credit quality of the pool of borrowers, the
more sense it makes to screen borrowers.
A decrease in rv in the ￿gure shifts down the curve of p = ￿v (1=(1 ￿ x)). The mechanism
underlying the shift in the curve is that for a certain set of x and p just below the curve with
a certain value of ￿v, it is rational for the lender to pay veri￿cation costs to avoid the pooling
equilibrium-pricing of the securitized product by investors when veri￿cation costs become
less expensive. The e⁄ects of the decline in ￿v on the welfare loss in di⁄erent equilibria
17discussed in the last section are as follows: In the separating equilibrium, the welfare loss,
(1 ￿ p)￿v, decreases because the unavoidable cost of veri￿cation to achieve the equilibrium
without pooling equilibrium-pricing of the securitized product is reduced. In the pooling
equilibrium, the welfare loss, p(1 ￿ x ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿v), increases. This result may be somewhat
counterintuitive, since it is generally believed that any reductions in any costs related to
￿nancial transactions will improve e¢ ciency. In fact, the net ex ante gain of welfare in
the benchmark equilibrium, in which the investors know the true state of the economy, is
(1 ￿ p)(Sh ￿ D) + p(Sh ￿ D ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿v). This value increases as ￿v decreases. This is
consistent with the general faith in the bene￿ts of sophistication in ￿nancial transactions.
The point here is that ine¢ ciency in the pooling equilibrium is a relative notion. In the
pooling equilibrium, the attainable welfare in the benchmark case is larger for a smaller
￿v, while the attained welfare in the equilibrium is invariant to veri￿cation cost because no
veri￿cation is performed. Thus, the di⁄erence increases, which appears as an increase in
welfare loss.
5 Implications and Discussion
The main result of this paper is that, in the OTD business model, overvaluation of low-
quality securitized products from lenders￿perspective induces them to perform insu¢ cient
screening and to issue low-quality securitized products ine¢ ciently. This occurs when the
probability of being in the bad state is relatively small. Thus, we can say that the credit
quality of securitized products is likely to be deteriorated when boom times with an ample
pool of good quality borrowers begin to fade and the pool of good borrowers is in a downward
trend, but this trend is not yet widely perceived.
In the recent subprime mortgage problem, one factor suspected to underlie the scope of
the problem is inadequate screening of low-quality borrowers. This aspect was aggravated
as it became more di¢ cult, during a period in which the economy had been healthy for an
extended period, to ￿nd high-quality borrowers, since these borrowers successfully obtained
mortgage loans and their pool dwindled over time. The main result of this paper sheds light
18on why this happened from the viewpoint of the relationship between the price of securitized
products and incentives for screening.
The other important point made in this paper is that if the bad state is highly probable,
lenders will tend to issue only high-quality securitized products. This happens, however,
with the ine¢ cient cost of veri￿cation in the good state. Since investors cannot distinguish
between the good state and the bad state, the lender in the good state must separate his
high-quality product from the low-quality product in the bad state to keep prices high by
performing costly quality veri￿cations. Thus, at least in our stylized setting with asymmetric
information between a lender and investors regarding the state of the loan market, in which
the lender must verify the credit quality of the securitized product, the OTD business model
will not work e¢ ciently.
Finally, it is interesting to note that in this paper, ine¢ ciencies in the ￿nancial markets
occur even with perfectly credible ratings. This is in contrast to arguments stressing the
ine¢ cacy or moral hazard of rating agencies in the securitization process. In our model,
the ratings are perfectly credible once provided, but may still entail ine¢ ciencies. The
ine¢ ciencies arise because the lender determines whether to perform costly veri￿cation, and
because his incentive to screen borrowers and verify the quality of the securitized product is
related to the price of securitized product. This is a fundamental issue worth investigating.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that in the OTD business model in which the lender ￿nances loans to
borrowers by issuing a securitized product to investors, the price of the securitized product
a⁄ects the lender￿ s incentive to screen borrowers and consequently the credit quality of the
securitized product. Moreover, ine¢ cient screening level can emerge, depending on the state
of the loan market and screening and veri￿cation costs. The mechanism underlying this
result is that the lender compares the price of securitized products backed by screened loans
(high-quality securitized products) to that of securitized products backed by unscreened
loans (low-quality securitized products), and that the asymmetric information between the
19lender and the investors yields to relative overvaluation of low-quality securitized products
from the lender￿ s perspective.
In the context of loan sales by banks, Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) point out that
measures to compel lenders to provide partial guarantees regarding the payo⁄ of loans in
loan sale markets create greater incentive to screen borrowers and increase the credit quality
of loan assets. Although the setup of our paper di⁄ers from Gorton and Pennacchi (1995),
the results in our paper suggest that the appropriateness of such requirement for lenders
may depend on the state of the loan market.
What incentive schemes should be imposed on lenders? What is the optimal design?
These are the questions to be pursued in future research.
Appendix
This appendix provides the proof for Proposition 1. Inserting the equation ￿ S = (1￿p)Sl +
pSh, Sh = 1 and Sl = x into the condition for the pooling equilibrium Sh ￿￿v ￿ ￿ S, we have
the condition for the pooling equilibrium in the proposition. As for the welfare loss, note that
the net ex ante gain of welfare in this pooling equilibrium is (1￿p)(￿ S￿D)+p(￿ S￿D). Recall
that the net ex ante gain of welfare in the benchmark equilibrium, in which investors know
the true state of the loan market, is (1￿p)(Sh ￿D)+p(Sh ￿D￿￿s ￿￿v). Subtracting the
ex ante gain in the pooling equilibrium from the one in the benchmark equilibrium, we have
a di⁄erence of p((Sh ￿ Sl) ￿ (￿s + ￿v)). This is positive if and only if ￿s + ￿v < Sh ￿ Sl.
The condition is equivalent to the assumption made in this paper of Sl < Sh ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿v.
Inserting Sh = 1 and Sl = x into p((Sh ￿ Sl) ￿ (￿s + ￿v)), we obtain a value for welfare loss
of p(1 ￿ x ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿v).
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